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Summary
The 108th Congress may consider legislation to rewrite or to reauthorize the
Export Administration Act (EAA). H.R. 55 was introduced on January 7, 2003.
Through the EAA, Congress delegates to the executive branch its express
constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce. The EAA provides the
statutory authority for export controls on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies:
items that have both civilian and military applications, including those items that can
contribute to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry.  The
EAA, which originally expired in 1989, periodically has been reauthorized for short
periods of time, with the last incremental extension expiring in August 2001. At other
times and currently, the export licensing system created under the authority of EAA
has been continued by the invocation of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA). EAA confers upon the President the power to control exports
for  national security, foreign policy or short supply purposes. It also authorizes the
President to establish export licensing mechanisms for items detailed on the
Commerce Control List (CCL), and it provides some guidance and places certain
limits on that authority. The CCL currently provides detailed specifications for about
2,400 dual-use items including equipment, materials, software, and technology
(including data and know-how) likely requiring some type of export license from the
Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). BIS administers the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which, in addition to the CCL, describe
licensing policy and procedures such as commodity classification, license
applications, and interagency dispute resolution procedures. In the absence of a
currently authorized  EAA, the EAR is maintained under IEEPA authority.
In debates on export administration legislation, parties often fall into two camps:
those who primarily want to liberalize controls in order to promote exports, and those
who believe that liberalization may compromise national security goals.  While it is
widely agreed that exports of some goods and technologies can adversely affect U.S.
national security and foreign policy, some believe that current export controls can be
detrimental to U.S. businesses and to the U.S. economy. According to this view, the
resultant loss of competitiveness, market share, and jobs can harm the U.S. economy,
and that  harm to particular U.S. industries and to the economy itself can negatively
impact U.S. security. Others believe that security concerns must be paramount in the
U.S. export control system and that export controls can be an effective method to
thwart proliferators, terrorist states, and countries that can threaten U.S. national
security interests. Controversies have arisen with regard to particular exports such as
high performance computers, encryption technology, stealth materials, satellites,
machine tools, “hot-section” aerospace technology, and the issue of “deemed
exports.” The competing perspectives on export controls have clearly been
manifested in the debate over foreign availability and the control of technology, the
efficacy of multilateral control regimes, the licensing process and organization of the
export control system, and the economic effects of U.S. export controls. This report
will be updated periodically.
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Evolution, Provisions, and Debate
Introduction
Legislation to rewrite and reauthorize the Export Administration Act of 1979
(EAA)(P.L.96-72) may be considered in the 108th Congress.  The EAA provides the
statutory authority for export controls on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies,
items that have both civilian and military applications,  including  those items that
can contribute to the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry. The
EAA, which originally expired in 1989, periodically has been reauthorized for short
periods of time, with the last incremental extension expiring in August 2001. At
others times, including currently, the export licensing system created under the
authority of EAA has been continued by the invocation of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)(P.L. 95-223).
The EAA is the statutory authority for the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) which are administered by the  Bureau of Industry and Security1 (BIS) located
in the Department of Commerce.  These regulations establish the framework for
regulating exports of  dual-use, potentially sensitive commodities, software,
computers, and technology.  Exports are restricted by item, country, and recipient
entity. The EAA, which was written and amended during the Cold War, focuses on
the regulation of exports of those civilian goods and technology that have military
applications (dual-use items).  Export controls under the EAA were based on
strategic relationships, threats to U.S. national security, international business
practices, and commercial technologies many of which have changed dramatically
in the last 20 years. Some Members of Congress and most U.S. business
representatives see a need to liberalize U.S. export regulations to allow American
companies to engage more fully in international competition for sales of high-
technology goods.  Other  Members and national security analysts contend that
liberalization of export controls over the last decade has contributed to foreign threats
to U.S. national security, that some controls should be tightened, and that Congress
should weigh further liberalization carefully.
This paper discusses the Export Administration Act in terms of its evolution in
the 20th century, its major features including the types of controls authorized by the
Act, the Commerce Control List and export licensing procedures, and issues
concerning the maintenance of export controls under IEEPA.  It then highlights
several controlled commodities that have been featured prominently in export control
discussions. Finally, it discusses competing business and national security
perspectives concerning several of more contentious themes in the export control
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2 In the first half of the 20th  century, war, or the imminent threat of war, led to the Trading
With The Enemy Act of 1917 and the Neutrality Act of 1935. In 1940, Congress increased
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passage of P. L. 76-703, “An Act to Expedite and Strengthen the National Defense.”  In each
of these instances the rationale for control was the necessity of not giving aid and comfort
to the nation’s enemies.
debate: the controllability of technology, the effectiveness of multilateral control
regimes, the organization of the export control system, and the impact of export
controls on the U.S. economy and business.
The Evolution of the Export Administration Act
Export controls in time of war have been an element of U.S. policy for almost
one hundred years.2  The end of WWII, however, ushered in a new era in which
export control policy would become  an extensive peacetime undertaking. The start
of the cold war led to a major refocusing of export control policy on the Soviet-Bloc
countries. Enactment of the Export Control Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-11) was a formal
recognition of the new security threat and of the need for an extensive peacetime
export control system.
The 1949 Act identified three possible reasons for imposing export controls.
Short-supply controls were to be used to prevent the export of scarce goods that
would have a deleterious impact on U.S. industry and national economic
performance. Foreign policy controls were to be used by the President to promote the
foreign policy of the United States.  The broad issues of regional stability, human
rights, anti-terrorism, missile technology, and chemical and biological warfare have
come to be controlled under this rubric.  National security controls were to be used
to restrict the export of goods and  technology, including nuclear non-proliferation
items, that would make a significant contribution to the military capability of  any
country that posed a threat to the national security of the United States.
Coincident with the establishment of the post-war U.S. export control regime
was the establishment of a multilateral counterpart involving our NATO allies. The
large amount of critical technology being transferred from the United States to the
NATO allies, and the growing capability for technological development by the allies
themselves required the establishment of  a multilateral control regime.  Toward this
end, the Coordinating  Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was
established in 1949.  CoCom controls were not a mirror image of U.S. controls but
generally did reflect a uniformly high level of restrictions.
With little change in the perceived threat, the Export Control Act was renewed
largely without amendment in 1951, 1953, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962, and 1965. With
the onset of the U.S.-Soviet era of “detente” in the late 1960s, the first serious
reexamination and revision of the U.S. export control system occurred. At this time,
the growing importance of trade to the U.S. economy and those of our allies began
to exert significant political pressure for some liberalization of export controls.
Congress passed the Export Administration Act of 1969 to replace the near-embargo
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Conventional Weapons Export Controls: The Wassenaar Arrangement, by Richard F.
Grimmett.
characteristic of the Export Control Act of 1949. The continued shift of policy toward
less restrictive export controls continued in the renewal of the Act in 1974 and 1977.
The Act was comprehensively rewritten in 1979, and this Act forms the basis of the
export control system today. It was amended in 1985, and some moderate further
liberalization occurred in the following years.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, an event partially attributable to the
success of U.S. cold war export control policy, marked a dramatic change in the
nature of the external threat the United States now faces. Beginning with the George
H.W. Bush Administration, the export control system has been reduced in scope and
streamlined, but the basic structure of the law remains intact.  There are many who
see a need to revamp the Act, whether to enhance exports,  to shift the focus to
current national security threats, or to increase penalties for violations.  
The dissolution of CoCom in 1994 and its replacement by the Wassenaar
Arrangement in 1997, also significantly changed  the export control environment.3
This new multilateral arrangement is more loosely structured than CoCom and
members do not have the authority to block transactions of other members.
Generally more liberal control practices abroad raise important questions about the
ultimate effectiveness of U.S. export controls (under either the current or a revised
EAA) in achieving national security objectives and the fairness of unilateral controls
to American industry.
Congress has not been able to agree on measures to reform the Export
Administration Act that regularly have been introduced since the 101st Congress. The
export control process was continued  from 1989-1994 by temporary statutory
extensions of EAA and by invocation of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA). Thereafter, export controls were continued for six years under
the authority of Executive Order No. 12924 of August 19, 1994, issued under IEEPA
authority. Many of those who favor reforming the Act, whether to liberalize or to
tighten controls, contend that operating under IEEPA imposes  constraints on the
administration of the export control process and makes it vulnerable to legal
challenge, thus undermining its effectiveness. (See p.10)  Legislation passed by the
House and Senate and signed by the President on November 13,2000 (P.L. 106-508)
extended the EAA of 1979 until August 20, 2001, temporarily removing the need to
operate the export control system under IEEPA powers. Since then, export control
authority has again been operating under IEEPA provisions pursuant to Executive
Order 13222, issued August 17, 2001.
Legislation to rewrite the Export Administration Act was introduced in the 104th
-106th Congresses. In the 104th Congress, the House passed the Omnibus Export
Administration Act of 1996 (H.R. 361) on July 16, 1996, after hearings and
consideration by the Committee on International Relations, the Committee on Ways
and Means, and by  the Committee on National Security.  On July 17, 1996, the bill
was received by the Senate and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and
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Urban Affairs, which held a hearing but took no further action. Export control
legislation (H.R. 1942) was introduced in the 105th Congress, but no action was
taken. In the 106th Congress, the Export Administration Act of 1999 (S. 1712) was
introduced by Senator Michael P. Enzi.  On September 23, 1999  the Senate Banking
Committee voted unanimously (20-0) to report this legislation to the Senate floor
(S.Rept. 106-180). However, action by the Senate on S. 1712 was not taken due to
the concerns of several Senators about the bill’s impact on national security.
Export control legislation was again introduced in the 107th Congress. On
January 23, 2001, Senator Enzi introduced the Export Administration Act of 2001
(S. 149).  Hearings were held on this legislation by the Senate Banking Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee in February 2001, and the  measure was reported favorably
for consideration by  the Senate by a vote of 19-1 on March 22, 2001 (S.Rept. 107-
10). The Senate debated the legislation on September 4-6, 2001, and it passed with
three amendments by a vote of 85-14.  This bill was similar though not identical to
S. 1712, introduced by Senator Enzi in the 106th Congress. 
The House International Relations Committee held hearings on EAA and export
controls on May 23, June 12, and July 11, 2002. The House version of the Export
Administration Act, H.R. 2581, was introduced on July 20, 2001 by Rep. Benjamin
Gilman. As introduced, it was identical to S. 149, except for the additions of
provisions  related to oversight of nuclear transfers to North Korea. At the markup
session on August 1, the House International Relations Committee passed the
legislation with 35 amendments. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence(HPSCI) received H.R. 2581
through sequential referral. On March 6, 2002, HASC further amended H.R. 2581
and reported out the legislation by a vote of 44-6 (H.Rept. 107-297). HPSCI held
hearings on the legislation but did not alter it. The legislation received no further
consideration in the 107th Congress. The Administration supported S. 149 and
opposed House attempts to revise it.
In the 108th Congress, Representative Dreier introduced EAA legislation (H.R.
55) which has been referred to the International Relations Committee. This bill is
identical to S. 149 adopted by the Senate in the 107th Congress.  In addition, other
Members of Congress may introduce EAA legislation. One group of Senators
(Shelby, Kyl, Sessions, McCain, and Feingold) wrote to National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice on March 7, 2003 to highlight several provisions that they would
like to see in any EAA reauthorization legislation.4 
Analysis of Provisions in EAA Legislation
Several principles and concepts have been common to the EAA and to efforts
to renew and reauthorize the legislation. Generally, these provisions set out the types
of export controls authorized (including national security, foreign policy and short
supply controls), licensing procedures, the license review process, and penalty and
enforcement procedures, the latter currently subject to IEEPA authority.
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Types of Control Authority
Since the 1949 Act, U.S. dual-use export controls have restricted certain items
based on national security, foreign policy, or for the effect of domestic exports on the
national economy. These three categories form the basis by which items on the
Commerce Control List (CCL) (see below, p. 7) and items subject to the Export
Administration Regulations are controlled.  In practice, the preponderance of items
on the CCL are controlled for both national security and foreign policy reasons with
different control standards determining  the licensing policy of an item to a particular
country. 
National Security Controls. The 1979 Act restricted the export of goods or
technology that could make a significant contribution to the military capabilities of
any other country or groups of countries that would prove detrimental to the national
security of the United States. National security control items fall under the National
Security licensing requirement of the EAR.  The list “Country Group D-1" presently
serves as the list of controlled countries.5  Licenses for items controlled for national
security purposes are reviewed on a case-by-case basis and are approved if it is
determined the item is destined for civilian use or would not  make a significant
contribution to the military potential of the country of destination.6  
Pursuant to EAA, the goods and technology to be controlled for national
security purposes are identified by  Secretary of Defense and other appropriate
agencies. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary)
are obligated by the Act to periodically review and revise the list. In addition, the
Secretary of Defense is to develop and maintain a Military Critical Technology List
(MCTL).7 The national security based control list is also consistent with the control
list of the Wassenaar Arrangement. U.S. national security controls, however, do not
cover items that are covered under nuclear, chemical, biological or missile
proliferation regimes, or to countries covered by anti-terrorism controls. These items
and destinations are controlled for foreign policy purposes.
Foreign Availability. Items controlled for national security purposes are
subject to a foreign availability determination. Foreign availability exists when  a
good is available to controlled countries from sources outside the United States in
“sufficient quantity and comparable quality” so that control of the item would be
ineffective.(Sec. 5(f)(1)(a))  The 1979 Act charges the Secretary, in conjunction with
the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate agencies, with determining on a
continuing basis whether any item currently subject to export control for reasons of
national security meets foreign availability status. Under EAA, a request to make a
foreign availability determination can be made by a license applicant or through the
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9  For a description of the full range of foreign policy controls implemented, see BIS,
Foreign Policy Report 2003, available at:
 [www.bis.doc.gov/press/2003/ForeignPolicyReport/Default.htm]
initiative of the Secretary. If the Secretary makes a foreign availability determination,
the item must be decontrolled, although the President can overturn that decision with
a determination that decontrolling such items would be detrimental to the national
security of the United States. In such case, the President is directed to enter
negotiations with multilateral control partners to eliminate the availability in
question.
The 1979 EAA  provided  for the decontrol of items on the CCL determined to
have foreign availability, and it set guidance for the Secretary to make such
determinations. It gave the Secretary the ability to initiate such determinations and
it provided that license applicants could petition the Secretary to begin the
determination. The Secretary’s determination of foreign availability does not need
the concurrence of other agencies, but he must submit determinations to other
agencies as the Secretary considers appropriate. The bill also created the Office of
Foreign Availability to gather data for the Secretary to make foreign availability
determinations and to report to Congress on operations and improvements on the
ability to assess foreign availability. This office no longer exists. According to one
commentator, “this is, no doubt, largely because substantial activity in the 1980s and
early 1990s produced only meager results.”8
Mass Market. The concept of mass market status was proposed in EAA
legislation introduced in the 106th and 107th Congress. Neither the 1979 EAA nor
current regulations provides for decontrol of items based on mass market
criterion.  Mass market status was defined to apply to items produced or  made
available for sale in large volume or to multiple buyers. Under legislation introduced
in the 106th and 107th Congress, the item’s manner of distribution; its conduciveness
to commercial shipping; or its usefulness for intended purposes without modification
or service were also criteria considered when determining mass market status. This
feature proved to have been a controversial part of the legislation, and was cited as
a stumbling block in negotiations over the bill in the 107th Congress with some
Members arguing that its existence would provide for wholesale decontrol of
sensitive items. 
Foreign Policy Controls. The EAA authorizes the President to control
exports for the purpose of promoting foreign policy objectives, complying with
international obligations, or deterring and punishing terrorism. Currently, foreign
policy controls are in place for anti-terrorism, regional stability, crime control, United
Nations sanctions purposes, and nonproliferation objectives. This latter category
includes adherence to multilateral non-proliferation agreements in the areas of
chemical and biological weapons, nuclear proliferation, and missile technology. The
EAA attaches limitations on the use of foreign policy controls. Foreign policy
controls must be renewed on a yearly basis.9   It requires the President to clearly state
objectives and criteria for controls to be reported to Congress. It directs the President
CRS-7
10 See CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and Agricultural Products from U.S.
Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
11  EAR, 15 C.F.R. 744, Supplement 4.
12  EAR, 15 C.F.R. 754.
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to engage in negotiations to remove the foreign availability of items controlled for
foreign policy purposes, and  it requires the President to impose controls to comply
with international obligations or treaties. Furthermore, it requires a license for the
export of certain items to countries that support international terrorism. Additionally,
foreign policy controls are not authorized for sales of medicine or medical supplies,
donations of food, medicines, seeds, and water resource equipment intended to meet
basic human needs, or for sales of food if the controls would cause malnutrition or
hardship. Controls on sales of agricultural  products and medicines have been further
amended by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Title
IX, P.L. 106-387).10
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative. Controls based on the end-use
or end-user of an item (also known as catch-all controls) are also administered as
foreign policy controls.  They were introduced under the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI) of 1991, and they are contained in Part 744 of the EAR.
Catch-all controls require a license for export or reexport of any item, not just
specifically controlled items, if the applicant knows or is informed by BIS that item
will be used for nuclear, missile, chemical or biological proliferation activities. The
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) maintains an end-user list of entities requiring
licenses subject to EPCI11. Current regulations prescribe a presumption of denial for
licenses to certain entities in Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and Israel and to foreign
terrorist organizations as designated by the Secretary of State.
Short Supply Controls.  The 1979 EAA authorized restriction on the export
of goods and technology to protect domestic industry from shortages of scarce
materials and the potential inflationary impact of foreign demand. Few short-supply
controls remain in force; they include restrictions on exports of crude oil, petroleum
derivatives, unprocessed western red cedar, and the export of horses by sea.12 The
EAA legislation proposed in the 107th Congress did not provide for short-supply
control authority.
The Control List and Licensing Procedures
Within the Department of Commerce, the  Bureau of Industry and Security
administers the license application process.  In FY2002,  BIS reviewed 10,767
applications with a total value of $18.6 billion (approximately 2.7% of the value of
all U.S. exports). It approved 8,735 (81%), denied 206 (2%), and returned 1,826
(17%) licenses.13 In FY2002, 86% of all applications for a license were referred to
other government agencies for evaluation, extending the length of the review process.
The average processing time for license applications that were referred was 44 days,
CRS-8
14 BXA Annual Report - 2001, pp. vi-vii.,  Applications are often returned without action
if no license is required.
15 See GAO Report 02-996, Export Controls: Processes for Determining Proper Control of
Defense Related Items Need Improvement, September 2002; House Report 105-851, U.S.
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a length of time that has gradually increased since FY1996 when the average duration
was 26 days.14
Commerce Control List. The 1979 EAA directed the Secretary of
Commerce (Secretary) to create a control list, known in the Export Administration
Regulations as the Commerce Control List). The CCL includes items controlled for
national security purposes, foreign policy controls and short- supply purposes.  Under
foreign policy controls, it incorporates  the control lists of the multilateral non-
proliferation regimes to which the U.S. adheres. The CCL currently provides detailed
specifications for about  2,400 dual-use items including equipment, materials,
software, and technology (including data and know-how) likely requiring some type
of export license. The description of the item also enumerates the control(s)
applicable to the item. In many cases, items on the CCL will only require a license
if going to a particular country. In addition, items on the CCL often are eligible for
license exceptions, a practice that, while not requiring prior approval for an export,
vests exporters with certain due diligence and record-keeping requirements related
to a given transaction. Yet some products, even if shipped to a friendly nation, will
require a license due to the high risk of diversion to an unfriendly destination or
because of the controversial nature of the product.  The end-use and the end-user can
also trigger a restriction. The CCL is periodically updated (with the benefit of
significant input from other government agencies) to decontrol broadly available
items and to focus controls on critical technologies and on key items in which the
targeted countries are deficient. 
Commodity Classification. The process by which an item is placed on the
CCL is known as commodity classification. This process has engendered
considerable controversy in the debate over the EAA. The commodity classification
process directs the exporter to request from BIS a recommended classification for an
export item if that item does not correspond to an existing CCL listing. BIS is
required to refer these requests to State and Defense under certain referral criteria
promulgated in 1996. Commerce has been criticized by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) and by a select committee of the U.S. House of Representatives
investigating improper transfers of U.S. technology to China (the Cox Commission)
for the low amount of classifications the agency has referred.15 Because of the
differing licensing requirements at State and Commerce, a classification decision that
excludes input from State and Defense  may contribute to the export of items that, if
referred, may be found to fall under the jurisdiction of the State Department’s
International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 
License Review Procedures. The EAA and the implementing Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) establish policies and procedures for the review
of license applications and the resolution of interagency disputes. Procedures
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currently employed were created by Executive Order 1298116, as amended, of
December 6, 1995. These procedures confer on the Secretary of Commerce (the
Secretary) the power to review and to determine the disposition of  export licenses.
The Departments of State, Defense, and Energy have authority to review any licenses
submitted, and the Secretary may refer licenses to others as he deems appropriate.
These agencies may waive their right to review license applications for certain
commodities or to certain destinations. 
Within nine days of  a license application’s registration, the Secretary must seek
additional information, refer the application to other agencies, assure the security
classification is correct, return the application if a license is not required, grant the
application, or notify the applicant of denial. In case of  review by another agency,
the reviewing agency must request any additional information from the Secretary
within 10 days. After reviewing the file, the reviewing agency may  request
additional information which the Secretary shall promptly request from the applicant.
Within 30 days of receipt of the application, or of requested review information,
the agency must recommend approval or denial of the application, and provide
regulatory or statutory justification for a denial. If an agency fails to provide a
recommendation within 30 days, the agency is deemed to have no objection to the
decision of the Secretary. However, the license application is subject to several
actions that can ‘stop the clock’ on the license application.
Dispute Resolution. The 1995 Order created a three-level  interagency
dispute resolution mechanism. The top tier of this structure is the Export
Administration Review Board (EARB), an entity itself created by Executive Order
in 1970.17 The Board consists of the Secretary, who serves as Chair, and the
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Director of Central Intelligence are non-voting members. The Board may also
invite the heads of other agencies to participate as appropriate. Under the EARB is
the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP), which consists of the Assistant
Secretary for Export Administration, who serves as Chair, as well as the relevant
assistant Secretaries and appropriate officials from the agencies represented in the
EARB. The Operating Committee (OC) of the ACEP is the third tier which is made
up of representatives of the departments listed above. The Chair is selected by the
Secretary of Commerce and serves as the Executive Secretary of ACEP.
The dispute resolution process begins with the OC. The Chair reviews the
recommendations of the examining departments and informs them of his decision
within 14 days of the deadline for receiving agency recommendations. Any reviewing
department may appeal the decision of the Chair to the ACEP. An appeal may be
made within five days by an appointee of the President and must state the statutory
or regulatory basis for the appeal. The ACEP members review recommendations and
information and  vote on the application within 11 days of such an appeal. Within
five days of  a  majority decision of the ACEP, a department head of a dissenting
agency may appeal the decision  to the Secretary. Within 11 days of such an appeal,
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the EARB must decide by majority vote on the disposition of the application. A
member of EARB may appeal this decision to the President within five days of the
application. The interagency appeal  process must be completed within 90 days of the
registration of the application. However, the Order does not set a time frame for
Presidential consideration of a license decision. 
BIS’s denial of an export license must be explicitly supported by the statutory
and regulatory basis for the denial, giving specific considerations and modifications
that would allow BIS to reconsider an application.  An explicit appeal procedure is
specified in the EAR.  One  possible basis for appeal is an assessment of foreign
availability (see above, p.5).  If the item in question can be shown to be readily
available from a non-U.S. source in sufficient quantity and of comparable quality
then a license denial may, in some cases, be reversed.
Issues Concerning  IEEPA18
When the 1979 EAA first expired in September 1990, President George H.W.
Bush extended existing export regulations by executive order, invoking emergency
authority contained in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).19
As required by IEEPA, the President first declared a national emergency “with
respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy
and economy of the United States” posed by the expiration of the Act.  IEEPA-based
controls were later terminated during two temporary EAA extensions enacted in 1993
and 1994 as Congress attempted to craft new export control legislation.20  After the
second extension expired in August of 1994, President Clinton reimposed controls
under IEEPA.21 During this period, a major restructuring and reorganization of export
control regulations was published as an interim rule in the March 23, 1996 Federal
Register. On November 11, 2000, President Clinton signed legislation to extend the
authority of the 1979 Act until August 20, 200122, when emergency controls were
renewed by  President George W. Bush pursuant to Executive Order 13222.  Several
deficiencies have been noted in maintaining export controls under IEEPA authority:
! Penalty authorities under IEEPA are substantially lower than under
the EAA and thus have less of a deterrent effect.  IEEPA limits civil
penalties to $10,000, willful violations to $50,000, and 10 years’
imprisonment if the violator is an individual or corporate officer
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who has knowingly participated in a violation. Equivalent penalties
under the EAA limit civil penalties to $10,000, or $100,000 for
violations involving national security controls, and willful violation
to $250,000 and 10 years’ imprisonment for individuals and $1
million or 5 times the value of exports for firms.  Even the higher
EAA penalties have lost some of their deterrent effect due to erosion
by inflation.
! The police power of  enforcement agents lapsed with the EAA.
Under IEEPA, these agents must obtain Special Deputy U.S.
Marshal status in order to function as law enforcement officers, a
complication that consumes limited resources better used on
enforcement. 
! IEEPA does not authorize the President to limit the jurisdiction of
federal courts and thus does not permit him to extend the EAA’s
general denial of judicial review. In addition, IEEPA does not have
an explicit confidentiality provision to authorize protection from
public disclosure of information pertaining to the export license
applications and enforcement.23
! The IEEPA does not explicitly authorize the executive to implement
provisions to discourage compliance with foreign boycotts against
friendly countries.
! It has been argued that the United States sends the wrong message
to other countries by not enacting appropriate legislation. Although
the United States has been urging countries such as Russia,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and China  to strengthen their export control
laws and implementing regulations, goes the argument, U.S. export
controls laws have expired and U.S. credibility is diminished by its
lack of a statute.24
Technology and Commodities of  Concern
Controversial exports have included telecommunications and advanced
electronic equipment, precision machine tools (especially computer assisted
CRS-12
25  For additional information, see: CRS Report RL31175, High Performance Computers
and Export Control Policy: Issues for Congress, by Glenn McLoughlin and Ian F. Fergusson
(hereafter, RL31175).
26  For HPCs, the Commerce Department organized countries of destination into 4 tiers with
increasing levels of export control. These range from a no-license policy for HPC exports
to Tier 1 countries (Western Europe, Australia, Mexico, Japan, and New Zealand) to the
virtual embargo for exports to Tier 4 countries (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria).  Tier 3 countries, including China, Russia and other countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), India, and Pakistan, were subject to a dual
control system distinguishing between civilian and military end-users and end-uses until
2000. In January 2001, President Clinton merged the Tier I and Tier 2 categories and
effectively decontrolled exports to those countries.
27 For a summary of changes to HPC controls, see RL31175, and Bureau of Industry and
Security, “High Performance Computer Export Controls,”                     
[www.bis.doc.gov/HPCs/Default.htm]
28 The National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 lowered the notification requirement
from 180 to 60 days, H.Rept. 106-945, Sec. 1234, October 6, 2000.
machines), guidance technology (including Global Positioning System technology),
aerospace and jet engine technology, synthetic materials (especially high-strength,
light-weight, heat- and corrosion-resistant materials), specialized manufacturing and
testing equipment (including mixers, high temperature ovens, heat and vibration
simulators).  In the last few years, congressional attention has focused on the
following goods and technologies:
High Performance Computers (HPCs).25  These technologically advanced
computers can perform multiple, complex digital operations within seconds.
Sometimes also called supercomputers, HPCs are actually a wide range of
technologies that also include bundled workstations, mainframe computers, advanced
microprocessors, and software.  The benchmark used for gauging HPC computing
performance is the  standard know as millions of theoretical operations per second
(MTOPS). The actual MTOPS performed by an HPC over a period of time can vary,
based on which operations are performed (some can take longer than others or can
be performed while other operations are taking place) and the real cycle speed of the
computer.  Since the advent of this technology, there have been restrictions on U.S.
exports.  However, some advocates have maintained that because the computing
capabilities of HPCs have advanced so rapidly, and due to the foreign availability of
models comparable to some of those produced in the United States, export
restrictions of HPCs are neither practical or enforceable.  During the Clinton
Administration, HPC export thresholds–or the amount of MTOPS capability that an
HPC would need to require a license–were  raised several times.  The last change was
in January  2002, when the Bush Administration raised the MTOPS threshold of
HPC exports to Tier 326 countries to 190,000 MTOPS, up from 2,000 MTOPS in
1995.27  This change is subject to notification requirements of  Title XII (B) of
Division A of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998 (NDAA98), which
allows implementation of the performance level 60 days after a report has been
submitted to Congress justifying the new levels.28
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 NDAA98 imposed special conditions on the export of high performance
computers. This Title (a) requires the prior notification requirement for exports of
HPCs above the MTOPS threshold to Tier III countries. Under this provision of
NDAA, exports of these HPCs are subject to the approval of the Secretaries of
Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State; (b) imposes post-shipment verification
requirements for these HPCs; and (c) imposes the requirement to notify Congress of
an adjustment in the MTOPS threshold levels. Each version of EAA in the 107th
Congress provided for the repeal of NDAA98 provisions. Repeal of Title XII(B)
would not remove MTOPS as a regulatory standard, but it would remove the
statutory requirement to use MTOPS. The President would still be able to modify
MTOPS thresholds or implement a new standard for control. The HASC version of
EAA in the 107th Congress (H.R.2581AS) would have also repealed the NDAA
restrictions provided that the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State
jointly develop and alterative rubric to monitor, assess, and verify HPC exports.
Encryption.  Encryption is the process of encoding electronic messages to
transfer important information and data securely. “Keys” are needed to unlock or
decode the message.  Encryption is an important element of e-commerce security,
however this technology is also central to cryptography and could affect military
code-breaking capabilities. The increased civilian importance of encryption
technology resulted in the transfer in control authority of certain encryption
technology from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce by
Executive Order 13026 on November 16, 1996. Since that time, there have been
several decontrols of encryption items and technology, most recently in June 2002
to reflect changes in the control list of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The result of
these actions has been the progressive decontrol of “retail” or “mass market”
encryption technology. Currently, retail encryption products and technology can be
exported to western countries29, and to non-governmental end-users in other countries
through a license exemption that requires notification of the transaction.  Licenses
for encryption products and technology continue to be required for countries covered
by anti-terrorism controls. 
Stealth Technology and Materials.  Stealth design incorporates materials,
shapes, and structures into a functional system to protect it against electronic
detection. Stealth technology falls into two categories.  Certain stealth materials can
deflect an incoming radar signal to neutral space thus preventing the radar receiver
from “seeing” the object. Conversely, other materials may absorb incoming radar
signals preventing them from reflecting back to the receiver. Stealth related
commodities are sensitive from an export control perspective because some materials
and processes involved have civil applications that make it difficult to control
dissemination and retain U.S. leadership in this technology. Concerns over the
potential export of this material led the Department of State to reclassify certain
stealth-related technology as munitions in the 1990s.30 
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Satellites.  Congress has debated the issues of how strictly to control exports
of commercial communications satellites and whether monitoring of foreign launch
operations has been effective in preventing disclosures of missile secrets. In 1998,
the Cox Committee found that U.S. satellite manufacturers provided  missile design
information and skills to China through the improper transfer of launch failure
analysis.31 Exports of satellites were licensed by the Department of Commerce from
late 1996 until March 1999.  In October 1998, Congress  returned the authority,
effective March 15, 1999, to license exports of commercial communications satellites
to the Department of State which had traditionally licensed missile technology
exports.32 The satellite industry claims that this transfer has led to licensing delays
and lost sales resulting from regulatory uncertainty, and they have lobbied to reverse
export controls to Commerce.33 Satellites launched for commercial communication
purposes may contain embedded sensitive technology such as positioning thrusters,
signal encryption, mating and separation mechanisms, and multiple satellite/reentry
vehicle systems. As stand-alone items, these technologies are controlled under the
U.S. Munitions List. One version of EAA legislation in the 107th Congress proposed
to transfer the licensing of commercial communications satellite sales back from
State to Commerce.
Machine Tools. This category covers manufacturing technology such as lathes
and other manufacturing equipment used to produce parts for  missiles, aircraft
engines and arms. This capital equipment is increasingly sophisticated, employing
advanced computer software and circuitry. The industry has been vocal in claiming
that its competitive position has been hampered by the lack of multilateral controls
over sales of this equipment, especially the lack of consensus on controls regarding
China.34 
Aerospace. “Hot section”  technology is used in the development, production
and overhaul of jet aircraft both military and commercial. Technology developed
principally by the Department of Defense is controlled by the U.S. Munitions List.
However, technology actually incorporated in commercial aircraft is regulated by the
Department of Commerce and falls under a separate foreign policy-based control
category. During debates on EAA legislation in the 106th Congress, several senators
raised concerns about the possible decontrol of this technology and sought a  “carve-
out” of hot section and other sensitive technologies that would prevent such items
from being decontrolled.35
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Deemed Exports. Exports of technology, know-how, and non-encryption
source code is “deemed” to have been exported when it is released to a foreign
national within the United States. Such knowledge transfers are regulated by the
Export Administration Regulations36, which require that a license must be obtained
by U.S. entities to transfer technology to foreign nationals in the United States if the
same transfer to the foreign national’s home country would require a license. Deemed
exports are not expressly mentioned in the 1979  EAA. House versions of EAA in the
107th Congress sought to explicitly define deemed exports as exports falling under
the jurisdiction of the Act.
Competing Perspectives In the
 Export Control Debate
A principal theme in  debates on export administration legislation is the tension
between commercial and national security concerns. These concerns are not mutually
exclusive, and thus it is often difficult to characterize opposing camps. For example,
nearly everyone favors reform of the current system, yet  no one considers themselves
opposed to national security. Generally, however, many who favor reform of the
current export control accept the business perspective that such reform would assist
U.S. business to compete in the global marketplace. Others view the issue more from
a national security perspective. To this group,  reform should be concerned less with
the abilities of U.S. industry to export and more with effective controls placed on
potential exports to countries that threaten the security of the United States, terrorists,
violators of human rights, and proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. From
these different perspectives, controversies arise regarding the controllability of
technology, the effectiveness of multilateral regimes, the bureaucratic structure of the
licensing process and the impact of export controls on the U.S. economy.
Foreign Availability and the Controllability of Technology. The foreign
availability and mass market provisions of EAA reauthorization legislation, and the
underlying concept of the controllability of technology, have proved controversial in
the EAA debate. Industry groups that have taken an active position on legislation to
replace the 1979 EAA have considered  the adoption of these provisions as a key
benefit of potential EAA legislation.  The foreign availability and mass market
concepts are integral to their contention that the flow of technology cannot be
effectively controlled, and that U.S. dominance of cutting-edge technology can no
longer be assumed. According to their arguments, unilateral controls will not stop
other countries from obtaining advanced technology.  Advocates of this viewpoint
claim that “countries of concern” will simply obtain this technology from other
nations. Adherents to this view regard current multilateral controls on dual-use
articles as ineffectual.  From this perspective, only American business suffers from
the unilateral nature of U.S. export controls.  In the process, foreign business wins
new markets or gains an incentive to enter new markets.37 
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According to the industry position, unilateral export controls are also becoming
increasingly unworkable as the economy undergoes globalization.  The current export
control system is predicated on goods being manufactured or assembled in one
country. In many industries, however,  component parts are manufactured worldwide
and are considered commodities.  If these parts are not available from one source on
a timely basis, they can be obtained elsewhere.38  Purchasing managers at Daimler
Chrysler Aerospace, for example, reportedly have been instructed to reduce
dependence on American components for defense and space technology products
because of delays associated with American licensing procedures.39 
Other participants in the export control debate are concerned about the mass
market and foreign availability arguments advanced by industry proponents.  Critics
charge that the mass market standard would effectively nullify the whole U.S. control
regime by decontrolling any item that met the criteria under the law.  They assert that
virtually any product, including dual-use items used for proliferation purposes, could
qualify for mass market status.  Similarly, as one non-proliferation advocate testified
regarding EAA legislation in the 106th Congress, the foreign availability criterion
would allow the sale of “anything a controlled country can purchase from a rogue
buyer.”40
A related argument made by industry is that national security is enhanced by
robust export industries.  This argument is predicated on the changing nature of
defense procurement, research and development.  During the Cold War, the
formative period of the current export control regime, the military conducted
considerably technical research on its own and provided funds for research and
development.  Now that situation is largely reversed.  The military now purchases
many items ‘off-the-shelf’ and  relies to a greater extent on commercial applications.
Industry argues that it is in the national security to sell current technology  to generate
funds to develop future technology.  If American firms are competitively hindered
because of export controls, the argument goes, foreign firms will gain market share,
increase profits, invest more in R&D, shrink and possibly surpass our technological
lead. These circumstances, in turn, potential could affect the quality of the technology
available for national security purposes.  Thus, industry argues it needs a streamlined
export process, one that will not needlessly impede exports. 
Critics of industry’s national security position reject this argument. They
maintain that the United States does not promote its national security by selling
advanced technology to potentially hostile states.  This technology, if sold to a regime
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of dubious stability, could be used against the United States or allies in the future.
Proponents of this argument point to  the case of Iraq, which received U.S. weaponry
in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein was considered a useful counterweight to Iran.
Subsequently, this technology was used against Kuwait and allied forces in the
Persian Gulf War.  Reliance on the civilian sector for R&D, they claim, is a policy
decision brought about by declining defense budgets in the 1990s.  Some further
argue that R&D that advances defense capabilities  should be funded within the
Defense Department if it is necessary to maintain controls on technology to certain
nations.
Computing Power.41  Industry groups and some other observers have used
the rapid rise in computing power as an illustration both of the uncontrollable nature
of technology and the inability of the export control system to account for such
innovation. According to one national security analyst, attempting to control
computing power is not “feasible or effective.” He maintains that the restraint of
computer trade is self-defeating because it cedes markets and profits that could be
used for R&D.42
Increasing computing speeds combined with networking advances have blurred
the distinction between super-computers and commodity computers.
Microprocessors  that individually comply with export regulations can be linked
together to create servers with MTOPS capabilities that breach export thresholds.  If
enough processors are linked together, they can create a parallel processing system
with capabilities that approach those of a super-computer.  The Defense Science
Board notes that the ability to cluster commodity computers in order to multiply
computing power erodes the ability to restrict  access to high-performance
computing, even if high-performance stand-alone machines can be controlled.43 
Other observers believe the United States can restrict access to the highest
computer technology by limiting exports. They maintain that American-made
computers are perceived as superior, and thus carry greater cachet than products from
other nations.  They note that the purchase of an American-made computer product
also buys superior networking and service, often at a better price. Control advocates
maintain that these distinctions are significant, that qualitative differences are
important.44 In addition, networking a parallel processing system, as those without
access to advanced computing technology must do to increase computing capability,
presents additional challenges distinct from those faced by engineers of commodity
computers. 
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Post-shipment Verification. One policy that has been attempted to monitor
and verify the end-use of controlled goods is the post-shipment verification
requirement (PSV) on the export of HPCs mandated by Sec 1213 of NDAA98 (see
p.11). This section requires that a PSV be made for computers destined for computers
controlled to tier III destinations, including China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel and
other nations in areas of regional instability. 45  Lawmakers have been especially
concerned with exports of HPCs to the People’s Republic of China.  The GAO has
reported that China has restricted access to facilities that contain U.S. HPC exports.
It has also found that BIS has made limited efforts to monitor or to verify compliance
with the terms and conditions specified by the export license.46  Reportedly, the
difficulty in monitoring the end-use of HPC exports in China has been exacerbated
by the close ties that Chinese state owned enterprises have with the Chinese
military.47
The Effectiveness of Multilateral Regimes.  The United States
participates in several multilateral export control regimes. The principal multilateral
regime related to dual-use goods and technology is the Wassenaar Arrangement
(WA) on Dual-Use Goods and Munitions. The WA was created in 1996 and is the
successor organization to the Coordinated Committee (CoCom), the Cold War era
dual-use control regime that ended in 1994. The WA dual-use control list is generally
consistent with U.S. CCL items subject to national security controls. The United
States also participates in four proliferation related control regimes: the Australia
Group (chemical and biological weapons and precursors); the Missile Technology
Control Regime, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.48
Generally, these groups are characterized by national discretion, a common
control list, and regular reporting requirements. Each group has formulated a
common control list and member nations control the exports of those goods under
their own national laws, a policy know as national discretion. Unlike CoCom,
however, these organizations do not perform a review function prior to the grant of
a national export license. The regime’s members do pledge disclosure of export
licensing decisions, and pledge consultation on sensitive export licenses. Some
groups adhere to a “no undercut” provision - i.e. a member state will not license the
sale of an item in which a license has been denied by another state. However, these
groups operate by consensus and are hampered by limited institutional structures.
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Some observers contend  that the Wassenaar Arrangement, in particular,  is
ineffective because it relies on consensus of member states. The necessity for
consensus, critics charge, results in a  level of control acceptable to all.  Its minimal
reporting requirements mandate notification only that an item has been sold, thus
preventing effective pre-export consultation among member states.
Industry representatives stress the necessity of effective multilateral controls.
They argue that export controls are effective only if they are adhered to by all states
capable of exporting a given technology. For example, the machine tool industry has
been at the forefront in criticizing the unilateral nature of our export policies,
especially concerning exports to China. It notes that there is no consensus among
Wassenaar Arrangement countries on the proper limits of technology transfer to
China.  (Indeed, no country is explicitly targeted by Wassenaar.)  Stringent domestic
controls combined with minimal multilateral constraints only damage American
companies, according to industry spokesmen. They fault the U.S. for having an
overly rigorous licensing policy towards China, without noticeably pursuing a
strategy to convince our allies to follow our lead.49 
Proponents of tighter export  restrictions note that America  traditionally has
taken the lead in export controls and non-proliferation efforts.  These efforts included
the original EAA, adopted in 1949, and the establishment of CoCom.  They argue
that efforts to strengthen CoCom’s successor regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement,
cannot succeed if Washington itself is loosening export restrictions.  Thus, the United
States must take the lead in order to convince other nations to follow the U.S.
example.  Adherents of this viewpoint argue that the successful negotiating strategy
in these multilateral fora is to adopt controls first and then persuade other countries
to follow suit.  Hence in their view, an export control strategy pegged solely on the
policies of other nations, negotiated by consensus, is ineffectual and harmful to
national security.50
Both industry spokesmen and advocates of heightened export controls agree that
the multilateral controls need to be strengthened.  Yet, to do this requires consensus
on which goods and which countries represent a threat. There does seem to be
agreement among western nations to restrict dual-use items to a limited number of
‘countries of concern,’51 yet consensus breaks down with regard to other states,
notably China. The export control dilemma in this context becomes clear.  Without
consensus on a particular target country, the question becomes whether the United
States should impose controls unilaterally.  One then needs to determine either:
which non-proliferation or other foreign policy goals are sufficiently important to
offset possibly damaging American business, and  possibly costing American jobs;
or how large an economic benefit would justify risking important national security
goals.
China. Debate over export controls has often focused on China. The dilemma
that encapsulates U.S. export control policy to China is how to benefit from  the
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potentially vast Chinese market and low Chinese production costs while minimizing
the risk to U.S. security interests of exporting sensitive dual-use technologies to
China. Some representatives of the business community have argued that U.S. export
control policy toward China is too stringent. They claim such controls have hampered
technology transfers to China in the past few years while  the controls of U.S. allies
have not. They reported that Chinese companies will not ask U.S. companies to bid
on sales because of the delays associated with the U.S. licensing process.  As one
industry spokesman  has testified:  “The result has been that the Chinese are denied
nothing in terms of high technology, but U.S. firms have lost out in a crucial market.
This serves neither our commercial nor our strategic interests”.52  
However, other analysts and several Members of Congress have expressed grave
concerns about China’s dual-use technology acquisitions. They cite findings of the
Cox Commission that China evaded existing export controls to illegally obtain
missile design and satellite technology and that China has circumvented end-user
controls on high-performance computers.53 According to this view, the Commission’s
findings show the need for both tightened controls and greater enforcement of export
controls against China. In addition, China has been implicated in several nuclear,
missile, and chemical proliferation activities.54  In 2002, BIS approved 777 licenses
to China, 40% of which were reported to be applications for “deemed exports.”
These applications represented potential sales of $2.1 billion, or approximately 10%
of the total value of U.S. exports to China in 2002 ($20.6 billion).55 
The Licensing Process and Organization of the Export Control
System. As noted earlier, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the
Department of Commerce (DOC) is responsible for regulating  dual-use exports.
However, other agencies also provide input into the licensing process. BIS consults
with other members of the national security community on license applications and
commodity classifications.  The Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the Department
of Defense conducts national security reviews for license applications referred from
Commerce and State.  The Department of Energy also reviews dual-use license
applications referred by BIS for nuclear uses and nuclear end-users, and it and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission license exportation of nuclear materials.  In
addition, the Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) at the State Department
administers the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.  Through the U.S.
Munitions List, ODTC controls the export of weapons and military technology.
Industry leaders identify several problems with the existing licensing system.
First, overlapping jurisdiction between the Commerce and State Departments with
regard to certain dual-use products makes it unclear where the exporters need to
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apply for licenses.  Second, extended time periods required for license approval
compromise the reliability of U.S. suppliers and make it hard for manufacturers and
customers to plan ahead.  Third, the licensing system does not reflect advances in
technology, foreign availability of dual-use items, and the economic impact of export
controls on the industrial base.  Finally, there is no opportunity for judicial review of
licensing decisions.  
Others consider foreign availability and economic impact to be important
considerations, yet secondary to national security.  Export administration officials
claim that they conduct thorough, fair, and expeditious license reviews.  Time is
required to check proposed export items against lists of controlled items, check end
users and end uses against lists of suspect recipients, and coordinate with several
government agencies.  Officials say they must be able to “stop the clock” to obtain
additional information and investigate certain issues on a case-by- case basis to
insure that sensitive technologies do not find their way into the wrong hands.  
Some analysts who see national security as the primary purpose of the export
control regime  question whether BIS belongs in the Department of Commerce. They
claim that DOC’s mission is mostly one of promoting exports and generally serving
commercial interests.  This, in some eyes, may create an institutional bias towards
the granting of export licenses and skew the process against national security goals.
Other analysts point to the full and equal participation of other agencies, particularly
the Department of Defense, in the current structure to argue that such bias is unlikely
to prevail.
Impact on the U.S. Economy and U.S. Business. The argument is often
heard that export controls damage the U.S. economy because they cause U.S.
manufacturers to lose overseas sales, thereby suffering a loss of global
competitiveness, decreased ability to develop new products and services, and  a loss
of profits and jobs.  Although export controls may have an overall negative impact
on the economy, the size of that effect may be overstated by individual claims of
adversely affected firms and sectors.  International trade increases national income
over what would be possible without trade.  Therefore,  export controls, by reducing
exports, curtail  this exchange and degrade U.S. economic welfare.  Standard
economic analysis indicates that the total economic loss associated with imposing
export controls would be the net outcome of several partially offsetting effects,
depending on whether one  is a producer or consumer and whether one’s economic
circumstances are linked to exports or imports.  Reduced exports in the long run
translate into reduced imports and diminished economic welfare.  But, the resources
that produced those exports are not lost to the economy and, when applied to other
uses, tend to raise economic welfare. Reduced imports (resulting from reduced
exports described above) in the long run assist domestic import competing activities
which will find their economic position improved.  
The combined effect of reduced exports represents an economic loss to the
overall economy, but a loss that is a  fraction of the initial reduction of export sales.
A  reasonable conjecture about the net welfare loss attributable to export controls
would be between 5% to 35% of the value of lost export sales,  with the more
probable effect in the middle of that range rather than at the extremes.  Based on a
1995 estimate of exports lost due to export controls,  these fractions translate into an
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RL30430, Export Controls: Analysis of Economic Costs, by Craig Elwell. 
57 BIS, FY2002 Annual Report, Appendix G, p 110.
estimated welfare loss  ranging  from a low of $500 million to a high of $14 billion,
but with the greatest probability attached to a central range of about $2 billion to  $4
billion.  Losses of this magnitude amounted to  from 0.007% to 0.2% of GDP in
1995.  Liberalization of export controls since the early 1990s suggests that this
burden would have become even smaller today.56  BIS, in its 2002 Annual Report,
states that while exports to controlled destinations traditionally have been low,
exports of capital goods items, including machinery and transportation equipment,
make up a disproportionate amount of exports to controlled countries. However, BIS
concludes that the overall impact of export controls in terms of job displacement and
injury to U.S. industry is small.57
